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ABSTRACT
Today, an increasing number of sociologists incorporate the theme of
social justice within their work and strive to contribute to efforts to improve
existing social conditions. In their view, sociological work that actively engages in
issues related to social justice exemplifies ‘the promise’ of sociology and
represents a means of refocusing and reinvigorating the discipline at a time of
perceived crisis. Yet, a growing body of evidence questions whether previous
efforts to use sociology as a mechanism of improving social conditions have
been successful. In this thesis, I rely on the works of Alvin W. Gouldner to
examine the relationship between sociology and the pursuit of social justice.
Specifically, I contend that Gouldner’s works reflect an awareness of the
problematic nature of such projects while attempting to reconstruct the practice of
sociology in a manner that addresses its shortcomings. Thus, Gouldner’s body of
work deepens our understanding of the problematic nature of using existing
social scientific paradigms to pursue particular conceptions of social justice while
attempting to formulate a vision for a new kind of social science more suitable for
such a task.
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Chapter One – Introduction
“Ich habe meine Gründe vergessen.”
– Nietzsche, quoted in Mannheim
Ideology and Utopia (1985: 20)

Through-out the world today, we are witnessing an increase in groups,
movements, and protests calling for social change. In the last year, the so-called
‘Arab Spring’, consisting of widespread protests and social upheaval demanding
social, political, and economic reforms, toppled authoritarian regimes across
Northern Africa and the Middle East. Today, within the United States and many
European nations, a variety of groups and movements have risen in response to
the prolonged recession following the 2008 financial crisis calling attention to a
diversity of issues ranging from the role of corporate power within society, rising
inequality and forced austerity measures which further erode an already
weakened social safety net, to increasing government intrusion in our daily lives.
These movements and groups represent a cross section of society, both in terms
of their political ideology and the issues promoted. Yet, what is common to all is a
sense of injustice that motivates them.

These movements attest to the continued relevance of social justice within
contemporary society, as well as highlight its contested nature and the communal
desire to improve social conditions through human activity. The idea to improve
social conditions is a powerful and omnipotent feature of modern society. Such
1

motivations are evident in the advertising slogans of commercial products and
the companies that make them1, the non-profit and charitable organizations that
we volunteer for or donate to, our political institutions and economic and financial
institutions. On a societal level these desires are often codified into conceptions
of social justice which seek to offer coherent explanations for the particular
arrangement and structure of advantages and disadvantages within society –
whether these be conceived of as the distribution of goods and bads in society or
political and cultural recognition within the institutions of society.

While the contested nature of social justice may lead some to question the
continued relevance of the topic, theories and conceptions of social justice play a
vital role in defining social issues that need to be addressed and what steps are
to be taken to address them. In this sense to is important to develop a theory of
justice that conforms to what we as a society think of ourselves and guides what
we would like to become. Having an inappropriate theory of justice can just as
easily obscure social problems and deepen the problematic nature of
contemporary society as it can alleviate them and make inroads toward the
realization of a qualitatively superior social order (Barry 2005).

This thesis explores the relationship between American sociology and social
justice. Many contemporary sociologists believe that sociological research has

1

Some examples include Bayer Pharmaceuticals - whose slogan is “Science for a better life” – Mitsubishi
Electric – whose slogan is “Changes for the better”.
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historically played a role in the pursuit of social justice ideals and believe that this
commitment to social justice should be continue to guide sociological work. This
thesis poses the following question: if American sociology has historically been
used a vehicle to produce knowledge about the social world that aids efforts to
improve social conditions and address social problems, then why do conditions
deteriorate at what appears to be an accelerating pace and attempts to improve
social conditions exacerbate and deepen the constellation of social problems
confronting American society? The current debate within American sociology
concerning the discipline’s role in promoting social justice appears misplaced,
once we connect current social problems confronting society to past efforts to
advance social justice. Given this situation, it is increasingly apparent American
sociologists who are serious about advancing social justice should focus their
efforts toward understanding how sociological research contributes to our
inability to effectively resolve social problems, and improve social conditions, and
how the practice of sociology in the United States would have to be altered in
order for such projects to be pursued2.

2

Through-out this thesis several different conceptions of social justice will be considered. However, I
define social justice as a mechanism for either challenging or legitimating existing social structures. This
view of social justice, while too broad for practical purposes guiding social activity, recognizes both the
ideological and utopian potentialities found within particular conceptions of social justice. Such a view of
social justice is heavily influence by Karl Marx’s writings pertaining to social justice and morality,
particularly within The German Ideology (see - Marx, Karl. 1978a. "The German Ideology." in The MarxEngels Reader, edited by Robert C. Tucker. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.). It should come as no
surprise, therefore, that the analysis of the relationship between social justice and sociology within this
thesis is deeply indebted to the Marxian tradition, which primarily finds inspiration in Marx’s writings,
unlike the various schools of Marxist thought, which conceives of it as a political blueprint from
transforming society.
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Sociology and Social Justice
Today, an increasing number of sociologists seek to incorporate the theme of
social justice within their work and strive to contribute to efforts to improve
existing social conditions3. To these sociologists, social justice is an integral part
of the discipline’s history (Feagin 2001a; Howard 2003; Perrucci 2001). In their
view, sociological work that actively engages in issues related to social justice
exemplifies ‘the promise’ of sociology and represents a means of refocusing and
reinvigorating the discipline at a time of perceived crisis (Davis 1994). Yet, a
growing body of evidence raises questions over the efficacy of past efforts to use
sociological research as a mechanism for improving social conditions.
Increasingly, the possibility that the pursuit of social justice ideals under the aegis
of sociological research has contributed to the problems facing contemporary
society is becoming more and more evident (Dahms 2008). For example, the
distributive justice framework, which has become synonymous with the pursuit of
social justice within modernity (Barry 1989; Jackson 2005), simultaneously
produced a level of economic abundance for some social groups while
contributing to a dizzying array of environmental problems (Schnaiberg and
Gould 1994; York, Rosa and Dietz 2003) and promoting a mental framework
incapable of thinking in non-economic terms (Foster 2002; Paehlke 2003), that
hinders our ability to develop real and lasting solutions to these problems.

3

The discussion of the relationship between sociology and social justice primarily exists within American
sociology. As such, the analysis within this thesis is limited to American sociology.
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Indeed, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the types of problems
confronting contemporary society challenge the capabilities of existing social
scientific paradigms to fully comprehend them and design strategies for their
effective resolution (Latour 1993). Problems such as global warming,
petroleum/fossil fuel dependence, persistent economic inequality, racism, gender
discrimination, sexual equality, simultaneously exist within multiple social
spheres. Recent debates concerning conceptualizing social justice acknowledge
the complexities of contemporary social problems and have attempted to create
hybrid notions of social justice that sufficiently account for these complexities
(Fraser 1998; Fraser 2000; Fraser and Honneth 2003). These debates reflect an
awareness that past conceptions of social justice have largely failed to achieve
their stated goals and may have even contributed to a deepening of social
problems (Fraser 2000; Fraser 2007). Yet, such developments have yet to be
mirrored within sociology, or many of the other social sciences. Thus, the
development of new social scientific paradigms becomes a necessary
precondition for sociologists committed to the development of a social justicethemed sociology.

However, sociologists must better understand the problematic nature of past
efforts to infuse sociological research with strategies to pursue particular
conceptions of social justice before attempting to development new social
5

scientific paradigms. To this end, critiques of the social sciences formulated by
Theodor W. Adorno and Karl Mannheim4 offer a useful starting point5. Both
Adorno and Mannheim recognize the association between the social sciences
and the desire to improve social conditions. Yet, both figures did not think that
the social sciences possessed the capacity to realize this aspiration. Instead,
each focused on the epistemological and methodological shortcomings of
existing social scientific paradigms and how these approaches to producing
social scientific knowledge undermine social science’s promise. In particular,
Adorno and Mannheim focus on the centrality of the subject (individual) and
object (society) relationship to the pursuit of social justice, reformulating it in a
manner that denies the unification of theory and practice demanded by social
justice projects (Adorno 1976 and 2005a; Mannheim 1985; Williams 2004). Their
critiques suggest that the practice of social science must be reconstructed in a
way that recognizes and addresses the persistent gap between theory and
practice that results from the mediation between the individual and society. Yet,
neither produced an acceptable version of social science that sufficiently
accomplished this task.

4

Of course, many differences exist between Mannheim and Adorno’s work. For an excellent summary of
the differences between Mannheim and Adorno’s theoretical positions see Jay, Martin. 1996. The
Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923 1950 Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press..
5
The importance of Mannheim and Adorno to the discussion surrounding the inability of efforts to promote
social justice to achieve their stated goals and objectives will be the focus of a later section of the thesis.
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Both Adorno and Mannheim agreed that the failure of sociological research to
meaningfully contribute to improving social conditions stems from the inability of
sociologists to recognize the presence of a persistent gap between theory and
practice that denies such ambitions. This deficiency, and our inability to
recognize it and formulate strategies explicitly designed to address it, represents
a fundamental flaw within sociological paradigms and the practice of sociology.
According to their critiques, the majority of sociologists who seek to advance
social justice fail to understand how the most basic features of social life deny the
most fundamental aspect of social justice – the unification between theory and
practice – and neglect to acknowledge how these processes are replicated within
the practice of sociology itself. In effect, sociology seeks to disavow its social
dimension.

It is clear, then, that sociologists must seek to understand why past efforts to use
sociological research to produce knowledge relevant to improving social
conditions have failed to yield their desired results. Any future effort to revitalize
this tradition within American sociology must first understand the specific role
sociological research had in undermining our ability to pursue strategies that
seek to resolve social problems in a manner that improves social conditions.
Such questions should be the first that sociologists who profess a commitment to
social justice consider and reflect upon. Yet, such questions are largely absent
from the current debate on the relevance of social justice to sociological
7

research. Instead, sociologists prefer to ask why individuals pursue a course of
action that undermine efforts to realize social justice ideals (Howard 2003) or
blame specific sociological paradigms (ie., Funcationalism or positivism) (e.g.,
Feagin and Vera 2001b) – if the question is even considered at all6.

A renewed appreciation of Alving W. Gouldner represents a promising step in
this direction. Within his work, Gouldner explicitly explored the inability of
American sociology and Marxism to meaningfully contribute to improving social
conditions and sought to uncover how the practice of each thwarted this goal. In
this sense, Gouldner engaged in an analytic approach that is sorely missing from
the contemporary discussion on the role sociological research plays within efforts
to pursue social justice ideals. That this discussion comes at a time when
Gouldner’s work has received little to no serious attention is particularly troubling.
The absence of a contemporary revival of Gouldner’s work suggests that
mainstream American sociologists do not want to seriously consider the ways in
which sociological research may undermine efforts to improve social conditions,
nor the problematic nature of the practice of sociology. Instead, what little
recognition Gouldner receives within this discussion suggests that supporters of
framing sociological research in terms of social justice understand the central
6

There are, of course some exceptions to this most notably the work of C. Wright Mills (see - Mills,
Wright C. 1959. The Sociological Imagination. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.), Moishe Postone
(see - Postone, Moishe. 1998. "Re-thinking Marx (in a Post-Marxist World)." in Reclaiming the
Sociological Classics: the State of Scholarship, edited by Charles Camic. Malden, MA: Blackwell.), Harry
Dahms (see - Dahms, Harry F. 2005. "Globalization or Hyper-Alienation? Critiques of Traditional
Marxism as Arguments for Basic Income." Current Perspectives in Social Theory 23:205-76.), Robert
Antonio (see - Antonio, Robert J. and Bonanno, Alessandro. 2006. "Periodizing Globalization: From Cold
War Modernization to the Bush Doctrine." Current Perspectives in Social Theory 24:1 - 56.).
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problematic of such projects Gouldner focused on within his work – the divide
between theory and practice – has been miraculously and permanently resolved.
This perspective fails to understand that both the problem of the relationship
between theory and practice is a permanent feature of such projects that is
historically, culturally, and politically contingent. By default, these sociologists
actively try to refute the dynamic nature of modern society (Dahms 2008), a
position that thwarts the actualization of social justice.

In this thesis, I rely on the work of Alvin W. Gouldner to critically examine the
relationship between sociology and the pursuit of social justice. Though his
critique of value-free social science (Gouldner 1962) is occasionally cited as an
inspiration for the type of politically engaged research such projects require
(Feagin 2001b; Wadsworth 2005), Gouldner formulated critiques of both
American sociology and Marxism that intimate the problematic nature of using
the social sciences to promote particular conceptions of social justice.
Specifically, I contend that his work reflects an awareness of the issues posed by
Adorno’s and Mannheim’s critiques of the social sciences, while containing a
vision for reconstructing the practice of sociology that, while incomplete,
attempted to address these issues. Thus, Gouldner’s work deepens our
understanding of the problematic nature of using existing social scientific
paradigms to pursue particular conceptions of social justice while attempting to
formulate a vision for a new kind of social science more suitable for such a task.
9

Method
This thesis uses the work of Alvin W. Gouldner to construct a meta-theory about
sociology’s ability to meaningfully contribute to the advancement of social justice
ideals that promote qualitatively superior forms of social organization, which are
characterized by being more just and democratic societies. Though an atypical
method, metatheory has long been an unrecognized methodological tool within
sociology (Ritzer 1990). Metatheory is often utilized in order to examine the
presuppositions that lie behind the surface of a theory, or are made in the pursuit
of social facts (Morrow 1994). Such analysis deepens our understanding of
extant theoretical and research paradigms and can be beneficial for the creation
and establishment of new, and implied better, theoretical and research models
(Ritzer 1990). For my purposes here, metatheory will both scrutinize the prerequisites for using social science to promote social justice with the hope of
deepening our understanding of the relationship between social science and the
desire to improve social conditions and coming to the precipice of formulating
new ways of pursuing the creation of social scientific that may permit such lofty
aspirations.

Such an analysis reflects a commitment to the basic tenets of both the sociology
of knowledge and the tradition of critical theory. Despite the rather significant
differences between the two, both schools of thought recognize the existence of
10

presuppositions that contaminate our understanding of the social world and seek
to establish modes of thinking that reflect an awareness of their presence. For
the sociology of knowledge, these beliefs emanate from our historical - social
location and prevent the creation of a scientifically guided political life (Mannheim
1985). Critical theory, however, is not content with such a reductionist
understanding between knowledge and social location and forges a more
complex understanding of this relationship based on the notion of social totality
(Horkheimer 1972). Yet, both of these traditions employ metatheory as a method
for producing knowledge about the social world.

Structure
This thesis is divided into four chapters each focusing on a particular aspect of
my argument. In the second chapter, I offer a brief analysis of the relationship
between sociology and social justice. In this section I will demonstrate how
critiques of the discipline reveal the problematic nature of using existing
sociologic paradigms to pursue research agendas that seek to meaningfully
contribute to the realization of social justice ideals and improving existing social
conditions. Next, I focus on the work of Alvin W. Gouldner, exploring how
Gouldner acknowledged that the methodological and epistemological
shortcomings of the discipline prevented it from realizing its liberative and
emancipatory potential. Finally, I explore Gouldner’s thoughts on how sociology
11

could achieve such lofty aspirations by considering his vision of a reconstructed
sociology and the type of social scientific and theoretical practices that would
create the necessary preconditions conducive to the establishment of liberative
and emancipatory social scientific paradigms.

In the next chapter I will offer a brief overview of the relationship between
sociology and the pursuit of social justice and demonstrate how critiques of the
discipline reveal the problematic nature of these efforts. Due to spatial
constraints, I shall focus on delineating how the theme of social justice played a
central role in the development of particular sociological paradigms at three
historical junctures: 1) the emergence of sociology during the 19th century, 2) the
apex of American sociology during the post-World War II era, and 3) the end of
the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. Specifically, I will explore
how the emergence of sociology in the 19th century contributed to a conceptual
shift in how the topic of social justice was to be approached within modernity and
how particular sociological paradigms support conceptions of social justice
formulated by political philosophers – in particular John Rawls (1999), David
Miller (1999), and Iris Marion Young (1990)7. My goal here is to clarify how

7

Traditionally, the topic of social justice has been the focus of political philosophy. Due to the level of
uncertainty that surrounds justice claims it is necessary to appeal to the work of political philosophers in
order to treat the topic of social justice with coherency. Conceptions of social justice must possess a level
of complexity that allows them to be applied to an extraordinarily broad range of topics and social
institutions – from distribution of advantages and disadvantages through-out society( see – Barry, Brian.
1989. Theories of Justice. Berkeley: University of California Press. - to gender relations in the home (see –
Okin, Susan Moller. 1989. Justice, Gender, and the Family: Basic Books.. Focusing on the theoretical
conceptions of social justice formulated by John Rawls, David Miller, and Iris Marion Young allows
particular sociological paradigms (i.e. – post – WWII Functionalism, contemporary mainstream
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conceptions of social justice have historically been a part of sociological research
by grounding certain sociological perspectives in particular conceptions of social
justice. Finally, I will briefly outline how Adorno’s (1976b) and Mannheim’s (1985)
critiques of sociology help us understand the flawed nature of these projects.

Despite assertions that the pursuit of social justice ideals have historically been a
part of the discipline of sociology (Feagin 2001b; Perrucci 2001; Wallerstein
1997), precisely how sociologists have contributed to the advancement of
particular conceptions of social justice remain unclear. Given the contested
nature of the concept (Miller 1974; Miller 1976), it is insufficient to broadly appeal
to claims of promoting social justice without offering more detail about the
meaning of social justice (Laclau 1996), making it necessary to incorporate some
of the contributions political theorists have made to our understanding of social
justice. This chapter provides the foundation for the remainder of my argument.

In the third chapter of this thesis, I explore Alvin W. Gouldner’s relationship to
social justice-themed sociological paradigms, focusing on how the problematic
aspects of these projects formulated by Adorno and Mannheim figure into his
work. While sociologists who seek to establish social justice as a guiding theme

quantitative research, and politically active left-ish/progressive sociological research) to specific, coherent
expressions of social justice, which view social justice in radically different terms. John Rawls’ A Theory of
Justice (1989) provides a coherent defense of the welfare state, as imagined in post-WWII America, as the
guarantor of social justice. While both Miller (1999) and Young (1991) present competing theories of
social justice in the vacuum left by the erosion of the welfare state as a politically viable mechanism for
ensuring social justice.
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of sociological research view Gouldner as an inspiration for such projects (Feagin
2001b; Wadsworth 2005), Gouldner’s own work reflects a deep skepticism
regarding the ability of such projects to realize their intended goals given existing
social scientific paradigms. Instead, Gouldner developed a critique of social
justice-themed sociological research that engaged the epistemological and
methodological critiques of these projects formulated by Adorno and Mannheim
in a way that concretely expressed the flawed nature of the social sciences in
both its bureaucratic and partisan forms. I contend that his critiques of the
relationship between the welfare state and western sociology in The Coming
Crisis of Western Sociology (Gouldner 1970) and Marxist sociology (Gouldner
1980; Gouldner 1985) offer insight into the inability of these paradigms to
acknowledge the disconnect between theory and practice and represent an
attempt to address the complex relationship between the individual (subject) and
society (object) that perpetuate this gap.

In the fourth chapter, I examine Gouldner’s thoughts on how the discipline of
sociology could be reconstructed in order for the discipline to realize its liberative
and emancipatory potentialities. Despite his criticism of welfare state and Marxist
sociology, Gouldner did not deny the possibility of an emancipatory sociology.
Instead, his work contains elements of a vision for a reconstructed sociology
based upon the principles of reflexivity (Gouldner 1970) and his notion of the
‘Dark side of the Dialectic’ (Gouldner 1976) that held out hope for the
14

establishment of sociological practices that may be conducive to such
aspirations.

Since Gouldner contended that history had surpassed our ability to utilize
existing strategies for addressing social problems (Gouldner 1980), it would run
against the spirit of his own work to demand a rote application of his ideas to
sufficiently address the problems of today. Yet, it is the very spirit of his work and
thought that is needed. I conclude by examining some of Gouldner’s own
shortcomings and suggest some logical steps that flow from a consideration of
his work and what sociologists can do to revive its essence.

15

Chapter Two – A Brief Examination of the Relationship Between
Sociology and Social Justice
In this chapter I will briefly examine the relationship between sociology and the
pursuit of social justice and demonstrate how critiques of the social sciences
reveal the problematic nature of such projects. My focus here is to outline how
particular conceptions of social justice influenced the development of sociology at
three distinct historical eras: 1) the emergence of the discipline during the 19th
century, 2) the apex of American sociology during the post-World War II era, 3)
the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century. Finally, I will illustrate how
Adorno and Mannheim’s critiques of sociology and the social sciences deepen
our understanding of why these projects failed to produce the desired results,
stating the issues future sociologists must address in order to embark on similar
projects.

The current discussion of establishing a social justice-themed sociology, inspired
speeches delivered by disciplinary leaders to professional sociological societies
(Feagin 2001a; Howard 2003; Perrucci 2001), lays out an ambitious agenda. At
heart, this movement attempts to address a fundamental problem within the
discipline – the absence of a central subject upon which a cohesive and
cumulative body of research can be constructed (Dahms 2007; Davis 1994) that
appeals to a broad audience. Increasingly major funding agencies have
questioned the merit of social scientific research (Mervis 2006), leading to a
16

sense of anxiety among sociologists over the purpose and task of the discipline
and how to gauge its relative successes and failures (Dahms 2007).

Superficially, it makes sense for sociologists to focus on questions and issues
related to social justice. Conceptions of social justice are intrinsic to society and
possess a level of complexity that lends itself to the many different perspectives
and substantive areas comprising the discipline of sociology. Sociological
accounts of social justice issues already exist within an increasingly broad array
of substantive areas of the discipline, among them criminology (Williams 2004),
social stratification (Davis 1944; Kelley 1993; Marshall 1993), social psychology
(Shepelak 1989), environmental sociology (Frey 2003), and even research
methods (Jasso 1999), bolstering the notion that the theme of social justice can
serve as a unifying theme within an increasingly fragmented discipline (Phillips
2001).

Yet, it remains unclear what sociologists mean when they talk of social justice.
While the current discussion of the role of social justice ideals within the
discipline emphasizes the relationship between the idea of social justice and
Leftist and progressive politics (Fasenfest 2009; Feagin 2001a; Feagin 2001b),
social justice is a contested concept that is continually debated from a variety of
political perspectives (Miller 1974 and 1976). Furthermore, the current discourse
of social justice within sociology, which relies heavily on Marx’s vision of social
17

science articulated in his 11th Thesis on Feuerbach, is either unaware or ignores
both Marx’s apparent ambivalence about the concept of social justice (Marx
1978a; Wood 1972) and the role social justice can play in the legitimation of
existing social conditions to the exclusion of visions of radically transforming
society (Jackson 2005). What is clear, however, is that the emergence of sociology in the 19th century coincided with a transformation in conceptualizing
social justice.

The Birth of Modern Society and the Conceptual Shift in Social
Justice
The idea of social justice can be traced at least as far back as Plato’s Republic
(Barry 1989). While political theorists debate the specific meaning of social
justice, it is generally accepted that the task of social justice is to justify the
distribution of advantages and disadvantages in the social order. However, the
majority of contemporary conceptions of social justice differ substantially from
how Plato or Aristotle approached the subject, despite repeated claims of
theoretical and conceptual continuity with the previous theories of justice. The
scope of social justice and the actions necessary for its realization distinguishes
ancient conceptions of social justice from those formulated in modernity.

For much of the pre-modern era, social justice referred to constructions of a
virtuous or ideal social order, one that was in accord with its stated values or
18

inherent characteristics (e.g,Aristotle 1962; Plato 2003). These idealist notions of
social justice sought to guide the development and transformation of the existing
social order by promoting a vision of what society should look like and providing
a justification for that particular form of social organization. To this end, social
justice fulfilled a teleological purpose within society, representing a set of ideals
to aspire to in the course of social transformation and development. Thus,
achieving social justice was not something that was possible within the existing
state of affairs. Its very purpose served to challenge the existing social order by
questioning the structural and institutional relations of society (Young 1981).

Yet, the emergence of modernity during the 19th century revitalized interest in
social justice and transformed the subject of justice resulting in a more limited
notion of justice concerned less with fulfilling a teleological function and more
with guiding the distribution of advantages and disadvantages within the existing
social order (Fleischacker 2004; Jackson 2005; Miller 1999). Early formulations
of distributive justice largely attempted to shore up the immature social order
amid increasing criticism over the existence of persistent economic, political, and
social inequalities that contradicted the democratic and free-market values that
formed the normative basis for modernity. Thus, the modern idea of distributive
justice attempted to legitimize rather than transform the existing social order.

19

The work of early sociologists like Comte (1953) facilitated the growth and
development of distributive conceptions of social justice. Comte’s works
intimated a concern for ensuring social stability that undergirded notions of
distributive justice. While acknowledging the existence of social problems, Comte
believed in the perfectibility of society via incremental improvements guided by
value-free social scientific research, based on the methodology of the natural
sciences, which would determine the natural laws of society as well as those
aspects amendable to alteration via human interventions. This social scientific
paradigm provided supporters of distributive justice with the technical means to
explore their particular vision of social justice as well the research basis to
support the interventions it required (Miller 1999).

Social Justice and Post-World War II American Society
The development of the welfare state policy apparatus represents one of the
most significant consequences stemming from the solidification of the distributive
justice paradigm. The idea of the welfare state established the double movement
that characterized the function of the state within liberal democratic societies,
tasking the nation-state with simultaneously guaranteeing social, political, and
economic equality and facilitating economic expansion and growth (Polyani
2001). It should come as no surprise, then, that the development and growth of
American sociology is deeply connected to the welfare state (Hicks 2005) nor
20

that the golden age of American sociology coincided with the height of the
welfare state within American public policy. Many early sociologists, such as
Lester Ward (Ward and Commager 1967) and Jane Addams (Addams 1910),
used their work to promote the growth and development of the welfare state and
defend it against attacks from laissez- fare theorists influenced by Herbert
Spencer (1969), whose Social Darwinism is often considered a representation of
justice as desert (Miller 1976).

Yet, the relationship between sociological research and the welfare state policy
apparatus did not fully mature until the post-World War II era. During the postWorld War II era, the ascendancy and solidification of positivism as the dominant
sociological paradigm combined with the rise of increasingly large, complex
bureaucracies to form a mutually supportive relationship that redefined American
society8 (Mills 2002; Steinmetz 2005). The two shared several key features that
established, what was at the time, an unprecedented level of collusion between
business, government, and social scientific research.

First, the conception of social justice that buttressed the bureaucratic structure of
the welfare state in the post war era possessed a commitment to objectivity
similar to the value-free social science promoted by early American positivists.

8

For a more complete understanding of the transformative impact the rise of large bureaucratic structures
had on modern society see - Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1976. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New
York: Harper Perennial. And Weber, Max. 1964. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New
York: The Free Press.
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Expressed by the theory of social justice most explicitly connected to the welfare
state as an original position in which the guiding principles of justice are chosen
behind a veil of ignorance (Rawls 1999), the idea that the manner in which we
arrive at an agreed upon basis for the allocation of advantages and
disadvantages remains free from influence from actual social conditions
established the very preconditions that allow for the resulting system of
distribution to be considered fair. Such a method attempts to sever the individual
from the social context in which she exists, in a manner reminiscent of the
cleavage between the subject and object that forms the epistemological
foundation for the value neutral research paradigm that characterized
mainstream American sociology of the time. Just as the concept of the original
position permitted the idea of ‘justice as fairness’ for politico-theoretical
understandings of social justice, for many sociologists borrowing this rigid divide
between subject and object from the natural sciences legitimated sociology as a
science (Kellner 1997; Steinmetz 2005).

In addition to this commitment to objectivity, both the welfare state and
mainstream post-War American sociology shared a common outlook concerning
the existence of persistent inequalities. Society, Rawls suggests, can never fully
and consistently comply with the principles of justice. Therefore, we must accept
an imperfect justice, provided that the social and economic inequalities are to
everyone’s advantage and attached to positions all members of society can
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attain (Rawls 1999). Sociological research in the area of social stratification
expresses the same willingness to accept persistent patterns of inequality that
seemingly violate our sense of social justice and the normative foundations of
society. Herbert Gans perfectly illustrates this perspective in his essay, ‘The
Positive Functions of Poverty’ (Gans 1972). In this essay, Gans applies the logic
of functionalism – that we should expect the persistent features of society, even
those considered social problems, to perform some positive social function – to
the topic of poverty, framing the problem of poverty as mutually advantageous to
the larger social order.

The entwinement of sociological research within the welfare state apparatus
profoundly affected the discipline, rewarding sociological perspectives that
pursued research agendas commiserate with the needs of policy makers and
institutions tasked with promoting the welfare state’s agenda. Sociological
research, as a result, increasingly focused on quantitative methodology, an
approach famously characterized by C. Wright Mills (Mills 1959) as abstract
empiricism for its single-minded obsession with a adhering to a particular method
over producing results that improves our knowledge of ourselves and the social
world we inhabit. Despite the continual erosion of welfare state policies in the
United States during the 30 years, sociologists remain committed to developing
quantitative research programs, with the discipline as a whole becoming more
rooted in quantitative research than perhaps ever before. The wealth of
23

quantitative research performed by sociology plays an important role in one of
the newer theoretical perspectives on social justice.

Social Justice at the Twilight of the Welfare State
As the erosion of welfare state policies continues within the United States, new
conceptions of social justice compete for the type of broad acceptance the
welfare state enjoyed for so long. Yet, these emerging perspectives on social
justice must contend with a substantially different milieu. For much of modernity,
the state assumed the role of ultimate arbiter of social justice. However, an
increasing commitment to neo-liberal policies within western democratic societies
and the effects of globalization have significantly weakened the ability of
governments to address social problems (Ohmae 2004). As a result, a greater
emphasis is placed on the role individual social actors and/or social movements
play in the pursuit of social justice. Despite this orientation, sociological research
continues to play a role in these theoretical formulations of social justice.

Quantitative Sociology and Contextual Social Justice

One of the conceptions of social justice aspiring to replace the welfare state as
the dominant framework for approaching issues related to social justice
challenges us to think about the contextual elements that influence our
perceptions of justice and injustice. Acknowledging the ideological foundations of
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social justice (Miller 1974), this emerging approach to social justice seeks to use
social scientific research to understand how people actually think about justice in
their everyday lives (Miller 1999). While initially examining the relationship
between particular societal-types and principles of social justice (Miller 1976)
using Weber’s (1964) idea that certain social structures correspond to certain
ideas, contemporary contextual notions of social justice present a more flexible
understanding of justice. They argue that the principles of desert, need, and
equality function differently depending on the specific social context to which they
are applied (Miller 1999). These theorists rely extensively on social scientific
research, especially the work of sociologists, to support their interpretation of
how people apply the principles of social justice in the course of their daily lives.
In particular, this perspective incorporates a great deal of sociological and social
psychological research focusing on people’s beliefs about social stratification
(eg.,Kluegel 1986; Kluegel 1981), distributive justice (eg.,Shepelak 1986), and
inequality (eg.,Kelley 1993).

Using sociological research in this manner exemplifies Judith Howard’s
suggestion that sociological research focused on social cognition and symbolic
interaction can promote social justice. In her presidential address to the Pacific
Sociological Association, Howard (2003) argued that micro-sociological research
provides insights into individual cognition and behavior that subvert institutional
interventions aimed at reducing inequality and promoting social justice. The bulk
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of this research represents a direct continuation of positivist methodology,
attempting to establish quantitative measures of both injustice (eg.,Jasso 1999)
and perceptions of injustice (eg.,Kluegel 1995) that mimic the natural sciences9.

Social Justice as Social Transformation: Counter-systemic Approaches to
Social Justice

One of the more intriguing conceptions of social justice developed in the last
twenty five years attempts to reframe the question of justice, focusing on the role
cultural and institutional practices play in perpetuating injustice instead of the
allocation of advantages and disadvantages (Young 1990). Formulated by critics
of the welfare state seeking to revitalize idealist notions of social justice, this
understanding of social justice, firmly rooted in the ideals of the 1960’s New Left,
expresses a firm commitment to enhancing human emancipation and liberation
from oppression, exploitation, and domination. The welfare state, they argue,
represented an inefficient and ineffective means of ameliorating inequalities that
promoted a false consciousness among disadvantage social groups which
deepened the repressive nature of modern society in order to enhance social
stability and subvert the democratic process (Offe 1981; Young 1990). Rather
than addressing the root cause of social inequalities, they suggest that the
welfare state created a one dimensional society that discouraged active
9

It should perhaps be considered more than coincidence that the increasing quantification of sociological
research coincides with the perception that economic concerns trump social and environmental problems,
for more on this see - Paehlke, Robert. 2003. Democracy's Dilemma: Environment, Social Equity and the
Global Economy. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
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participation in public life by extending the logic of consumerism into increasingly
more areas of social life and undermining opposition via the promotion of an
increasingly affluent standard of living (Marcuse 1991).

In lieu of the welfare state, identity-based approaches to social justice align
themselves with social movements comprised of marginalized and exploited
social groups to promote a radical pluralist democracy that acknowledges and
celebrates group difference (Laclau 2001). Whereas the welfare state promoted
social stability, these social movements often seek a radical transformation of the
institutional and organizational structure of society, finding inspiration in Marx’s
11th Thesis on Feuerbach (1978b). Despite implicating value-free social science
for its involvement in the repressive nature of the welfare state, this social justice
paradigm has inspired many social scientists to explore issues related to social
justice. Their call for radical social transformation finds expression within
particular sociological perspectives that seek to reinvigorate the discipline’s
counter-systemic legacy.

In his presidential address to the American Sociological Association, Joe Feagin
(2001a) urged his fellow sociologists to return to the discipline’s roots and renew
their commitment to exploring the theme of social justice within their work.
Feagin (2001a; 2001b) utilizes recognition-based interpretations of social justice
as a foundation for promoting counter-systemic perspectives within sociology that
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seek to eliminate oppression and exploitation while creating more just and
egalitarian societies. In particular, Feagin and Vera’s notion of Liberation
Sociology (2001b) urges sociologists to side with oppressed and marginalized
social groups via a participatory research model that actively involve these
groups in the research process, eschewing any notion of value-free research.

Mind the Gap: Critiques of the Social Sciences and the
(Im)Possibility of a Social Justice-Themed Sociology
Though these examples of how sociological research supports particular
conceptions of social justice represent a diverse cross section of the discipline, in
terms of methodological approaches and substantive concentrations, certain
commonalities exist between them. In particular, the idea of social justice infers
unification between theory and practice to ensure that the stated goals and
objectives are achieved and unintended consequences do not result. This is an
especially important feature of conceptions of social justice that desire radical
social transformation (Williams 2004). Yet, the proliferation of social problems
resulting from efforts to pursue social justice indicates that a gap exists between
how we theorize social justice and the actual practice of pursuing these ideals.
Thus, contemporary sociologists who desire to create a sociology concerned with
advancing social justice may well wish to consider why past attempts to promote
social justice did not achieve their stated goals and objectives. More importantly,
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sociologists should seek to understand the specific role sociological research
played in the frustration of such projects.

Critiques of the social sciences shed some light on fundamental problem facing
such projects. In particular, the works of Theodor W. Adorno (Horkheimer and
Adorno 2002) and Karl Mannheim (1985) explored the failure of the social
sciences to fulfill their stated goal of improving social conditions in a way that
aids our understanding of the problematic nature of contemporary attempts to
center sociological work around the theme of social justice10. Their bodies of
work suggest that the failure of the social sciences to improve social conditions is
inextricably linked to deeper questions surrounding the epistemological and
methodological foundations of existing social scientific practices, in both its
positivist and partisan forms. These critiques suggest that the reconstruction of
social scientific practices is a necessary precondition to realizing the promise of
social science.

Both Mannheim and Adorno attack the purported objectivity of positivist
sociology, suggesting that this type of methodological approach to the study of

10

Of course, many differences exist between the work of Adorno and Mannheim; see Jay, Martin. 1996.
The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923 1950 Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press. and Held, David. 1980. Introduction to Critical
Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. for an overview of the
relationship between Adorno and Mannheim and the substantive differences – and similarities - between
their theoretical perspectives. Gillian Rose also offers an excellent account of the substantive differences,
and similarities, between Adorno’s theoretical perspective and the sociology of knowledge – see: Rose,
Gillian. 1976. "How is Critical Theory Possible? Theodor W. Adorno and Concept Formation in
Sociology." Political Studies 24(1):69 - 85.
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society is impossible and does not improve our understanding of society. For
Adorno (1976b), value-free social scientific research willingly submits to the
administrative needs of society by focusing on an increasingly atomized set of
social facts that are inconsequential to furthering our knowledge of society while
oblivious to how it is conditioned by the social totality. Yet, it is precisely this
commitment to objectivity that categorical prevents such research from
recognizing or addressing the subjective nature of its work. As Adorno writes in
the “Introduction” to The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology:
“Positivism, to which contradictions are anathema,
possesses its innermost contradiction unbeknown to itself,
in the following: namely, that it adheres to an objectivity
which is most external to its sentiments and purged of all
subjective projections, but thereby simply becomes all the
more entangled in the particularity of mere subjective
instrumental reason.” - (Adorno 1976a)
Mannheim shared Adorno’s disdain for the idea of a value-free social science,
stating that “… no real penetration into social reality is possible through this
approach [positivism] (1985:44). Likewise, he recognized the extent to which our
knowledge of the social world and our attempts to understand it are intimately
connected to it.
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Yet, Mannheim and Adorno’s critiques of positivism did not translate to an
acceptance of explicitly partisan social science. Both felt that social scientific
approaches that pursued a particular agenda and aligned themselves with the
interests of particular groups failed to sufficiently recognize the extent to which
they are molded by their objective social conditions. Mannheim writes, that “…the
reverse – the greater the bias, the greater the objectivity is not true (1985:46).”
He later expands upon this position, directly implicating the kind of politicalpartisan social scientific research demanded by Feagin’s notion of Liberation
Sociology (2001b), stating that “[t]hose persons who talk most about human
freedom are those who are actually most blindly subject to social determination,
in as much as they do not in most cases suspect the profound degree to which
their conduct is determined by their interests (1985:48).” For Adorno, the drive to
pursue particular interests creates a disposition favoring action over theoretical
reflection and contemplation thereby denying our ability to explore moral
questions (Adorno 2001).

The critiques of value-free and partisan social science formulated by Adorno and
Mannheim point toward a common fundamental problem within the
epistemological and methodological foundations of the social sciences which
prevents them from achieving their desired goal of producing knowledge relevant
to improving social conditions and advancing the idea of social justice.
Specifically, Adorno and Mannheim indicate that the complex and interwoven
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relationship between the individual (subject) and society (object) denies the
unification between theory and practice such projects require. Value-free social
science rests upon the epistemological assumption that the knowing subject can
produce knowledge independent of the precise social-cultural-historical context in
which such activity occurs. On the other hand partisan social science, while
acknowledging the impossibility of objectivity, takes this to the other extreme,
using the existence of bias and the embeddness of our actions as justification for
producing knowledge with the expressed purpose of advancing particular interest
(eg.,Becker 1967). Yet, neither paradigm addresses the mediation between our
subjective selves and the objective social conditions stressed by Mannheim
(eg.,1985) or Adorno (eg.,Adorno 2005a; 2005b).

In essence, both Adorno and Mannheim affirm that establishing a thoroughly
critical sociology, understood as a sociology that calls attention to the processes
by which the individual (subject) and society (object) are mutually constituted and
simultaneously mediated (Rose 1976), represents a necessary pre-condition for
the discipline to pursue its self-anointed task of improving social conditions. Yet,
neither produced a sufficient vision for how social scientific practices could
accomplish this task. Mannheim’s (1985: 300 - 306) notion of relationism too
closely resembles the murky waters of relativism he hoped to avoid and does not
provide a sufficient foundation upon which to advance a morally charged
argument required by strategies to pursue notions of social justice (Goldman
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1994). Likewise Adorno’s (1973) quest to develop an anti-system founded on
non-identity thinking dismantles the foundations of existing social scientific
paradigms.

The spirit of these critiques led to an increased concern with epistemological
issues within much of the work produced by the ‘60’s generation and rejuvenated
the willingness of sociologists to develop and explore theoretical perspectives
and research strategies that seek to develop a non-dichotomous understanding
of the subject/object relationship (Cerrullo 1994)11. Among these, Alvin W.
Gouldner’s work stands out. His willingness to explicitly explore how the
methodological and epistemological deficiencies within existing social scientific
paradigms prevents sociology from realizing its stated purpose distinguishes his
work from many of his peers, and makes it especially relevant to the discussion
of establishing a social justice themed sociology. In the following chapter, I wish
to explore this aspect of Gouldner’s works.

11

Perhaps best represented by Pierre Bourdieu and his notion of a reflexive sociology particularly his
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Reflexive Sociology. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. – and Anthony Giddens’ structuration
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Chapter Three – Alvin W. Gouldner and Social Justice: Exploring
the Tragedy of the Social Sciences
In this chapter, I utilize Alvin W. Gouldner’s work to explore the problematic
aspects of incorporating a concern with social justice within sociological
research. While some sociologists seeking to establish social justice as the
guiding theme to sociological research view Gouldner as an inspiration,
Gouldner’s works reflect a deep skepiticism regarding the ability of such projects
to realize their stated goals and purposes via existing social scientific paradigms.
Within those works that he produced during the end of his life, Gouldner
developed a tragic vision of social science (Chriss 2002) that concretely
expressed the flawed nature of the social justice-themed sociological research in
both its bureaucratic and partisan forms.

Gouldner’s critiques of both the relationship between American sociology and
the welfare state (Gouldner 1970) and Marxism (Gouldner 1980; 1985) reflect a
shared concern with Adorno and Mannheim’s critiques of the social sciences
over the effect our mediated social existence has upon these projects. Like
Adorno and Mannheim, he acknowledged that the relationship between theory
and practice represented a crucial problem for both academic sociology and
Marxism (Gouldner 1973b: 97). However his work differs from theirs in one key
dimension. Rather than concede sociology’s liberative potentiality, I argue that
Gouldner’s work presents a vision for reconstructing the practice of sociology in a
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manner that holds out hope for the establishment of a sociology capable of
enhancing human emancipation and liberation.

The (mis)perception of Gouldner’s relationship with socialjustice themed sociology
As sociologists debate the discipline’s role in advancing the theme of social
justice, the work of Alvin W. Gouldner has failed to experience a significant
revival similar to C. Wright Mills (Lemert 2005), with whom he is occasionally
compared. Many current sociologists (eg.,Collins 1991; Feagin 2001b) embroiled
in this debate view Mills’ notion of the Sociological Imagination (1959) as a
source of inspiration for their project and his later political writings (Mills 1958;
Mills 1960) as exemplars of how sociologists can overtly engage in politically
motivated research12. Despite this, some sociologists do view Gouldner’s works
as important precursors to the recent discussion on social justice themed
sociology. In their book Liberation Sociology (2001b), Feagin and Vera reference
Gouldner’s most famous work, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (1970),
and suggest that their work completes Gouldner’s prognostication of a
paradigmatic shift within sociology away from structural-functionalism, with its

12
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emphasis on maintaining social order, and toward sociological paradigms that
draw inspiration from the Marxist tradition. Still others (Wadsworth 2005) view
Gouldner and other participants in the ‘paradigm wars’ within sociology as
important contributors to the establishment of participatory action research
models, which figure heavily into contemporary partisan sociological research.

Gouldner’s own body of work contains a number of elements that seemingly
support this interpretation. In particular, his early work focusing on establishing
an applied sociology (Gouldner 1957) that ‘mends the rift between policy maker
and social scientist’ (Gouldner 1956: 180) indicates a willingness to explore how
sociological research could serve the needs of the welfare state and inform the
development of public policy. Furthermore, Gouldner (1962) formulated a widely
influential, and widely misinterpreted by his own account (Gouldner 1973d),
critique of value-free social science that inspired a generation of sociologists to
engage in research that actively sided with marginalized social groups.

Yet, such an understanding of Gouldner ignores what is perhaps his greatest
contribution to sociology and social theory, what has come to be known as his
‘Last Project’ (Antonio 2005). Gouldner’s body of work that spanned the last
decade of his life covered a stunning array of topics – the rise and decline of
Functionalist sociology (Gouldner 1970), the role of technology and ideology
within modernity (Gouldner 1976), new class theories exploring the capacity of
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intellectuals to foment radical social change (Gouldner 1979), and a critical
appraisal of Marxism (Gouldner 1980; Gouldner 1985). Yet, the question of
whether sociology, in either its Western academic form or as Marxism, could
realize its ambition to facilitate the emergence of qualitatively superior societal
forms remained a consistent feature of this impressive body of work and guided
its development.

Specifically, within this project, which spans from The Coming Crisis to the
posthumously published Against Fragmentation (Gouldner 1985), Gouldner
critically explored sociology’s ability to realize its liberative and emancipatory
potential. As he writes in the introduction to The Coming Crisis:
“ [s]ociology has a dialectical character and contains both
repressive and liberative dimensions. The extrication of
and further development of its liberative potential will
depend, in important part, on the penetration of an
historically informed critique of sociology as a theory and
as a social institution.” (1970: 12)

Within these works, Gouldner developed critiques of American sociology’s
relationship with the welfare state and New Left social movements that highlight
their problematic nature while reflecting an awareness of the epistemological and
methodological flaws that Adorno and Mannheim suggest prevent such projects
from realizing their stated goals and objectives.
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Gouldner’s Critique of Social Justice-themed Sociological
Research
“The new academic practicality, in the social studies, for
instance, is not concerned with the broken-up human
results of the social process: the bad boy, the loose woman,
the un-Americanized immigrant. On the contrary, it is tied
in with the top levels of society, in particular with
enlightened circles of business executives. For the first time
in the history of their discipline, for example, sociologists
have become linked by professional tasks and social
contacts with private and public powers well above the
level of the social-work agency.”
– C. Wright Mills, White Collar, p. 54 (2002)

Within the pages of his book, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (1970),
and his rebuttals to the books many critics (Gouldner 1973b), Gouldner
developed an insightful critique of the relationship between sociology and the
welfare state, highlighting how the needs of the welfare state shaped the
development of sociology during the course of the 20th century and altered the
types of research questions formulated by sociologists and they were to be
pursued. The institutional, political, and financial power of the welfare state
provided social scientists, including sociologists, with an unprecedented level of
funding and prestige, designating them with the all-important task of developing
research agendas that explored the problems facing modern industrial societies
and producing knowledge that aided the construction of strategies to address
them.
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Yet, despite the close relationship between post-World War II Functionalist
sociology and the welfare state, Gouldner perceived a hidden tension between
functionalism and welfare state policy initiatives that created conditions for a
perpetual state of crisis within sociology. Functionalism’s emphasis, according to
Gouldner, on individual morality and self-regulating social structures conflicts with
the welfare state’s emphasis on state-intervention. In order to resolve this
tension, Gouldner believed that elements of Marxism and Functionalism would
converge, producing hybrid sociological paradigms that would undermine
Functionalism’s hegemony while forever altering the intellectual temperament of
both theoretical perspectives and their ability to fulfill their stated purpose of
creating new, and presumably superior, societal forms.

Specifically, for Gouldner, the envelopment of American sociology within the
welfare state policy regime severely limited the research agenda pursued by
sociologists and shifted discipline’s overall orientation. By becoming dependent
on financial and institutional support from the welfare state, sociologists
increasingly served as the technical foundation for exploring and addressing the
problems resulting from industrial society to the exclusion of other research
agendas (Gouldner 1970). Sociological research during this era displayed a
tendency to develop research agendas and pursue research questions involving
social problems which the welfare state was either prepared or able to address.
This manner of sociological research, Gouldner argued, possessed a specific
39

type of limited critical perspective aimed at unmasking competing policy
interventions rather than critically engaging the social totality (Gouldner 1970:
350). Ultimately, Gouldner chided welfare-state sociology for serving the
administrative needs of the welfare state, echoing the critiques of the welfare
state assembled by theorists associated with the Frankfurt School – especially
Marcuse (1991).

It is ironic that many sociologists (e.g., Becker 1967) used Gouldner’s (1962)
critique of ‘the myth of value-free social science’ as a justification for establishing
an avowedly partisan sociology that champions disadvantaged social groups, a
type of sociological practice exemplified within the relationship between the
welfare state and sociology Gouldner critiqued. While Gouldner stressed the
impossibility of exorcising ones values and personal biases from sociological
work, he hardly approved of developing an explicitly partisan sociology which he
felt served the professional interests of sociologists, describing it as ‘a sociology
of and for the new welfare state’ (Gouldner 1973: 49). Instead of a partisan
sociology, which entails an attachment to the interests of a particular social group
or political party, Gouldner (1973: 116 – 120) stressed the importance of
maintaining a commitment to particular values and ideas.

In his rebuttal to critics of The Coming Crisis (Gouldner 1973b) and his work on
Marxism (Gouldner 1980), Gouldner explored the problems of partisan social
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science more fully, especially as it relates to harnessing social science to the
needs of ‘the Movement’ as well in its Marxist form. For Gouldner, such efforts
possess a hidden dimension that reflects the value-free mantra that they wish to
replace. Namely, partisan sociology and Scientific Marxism rely on a belief that
the methods of value-free social science – e.g., survey methodology, quantitative
data analysis, etc. – are value neutral. Yet, Gouldner maintained that by
borrowing these methods without significant alteration, partisan projects
unknowingly reproduced many of the problematic features of society they wish to
change.

This aspect of Gouldner’s work remains especially pertinent to the contemporary
discussion of establishing counter-systemic perspectives within sociology.
Exemplified by Feagin and Vera’s notion of a Liberation Sociology (2001b), this
movement embodies many characteristics of the partisan sociology Gouldner
critiqued (i.e., openly siding with marginalized social groups, an affinity for
Marxism, etc.), including a continued reliance on the research techniques within
mainstream (i.e., value-free, positivist social science). Despite engaging in a
critique of positivism on the grounds that its value-neutrality permits it to be used
to further the systems of oppression and domination, Feagin and Vera (2001b:
29) assert that these same methods can be used to enhance human
emancipation and liberation. Rather than attempting to construct alternative
methods for establishing knowledge about the social world that aids the
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construction of attempts to transform it, liberation sociology relies on the notion of
participatory action research which continues to use standard social scientific
methods only replacing large corporation and government bureaucracies with
community groups and activist organizations.

Critique of Sociology and the Problem of Theory and Practice

The relationship between theory and practice represents a focal point of Adorno
and Mannheim’s critiques of social scientific paradigms used to pursue
conceptions of social justice. Gouldner displays a similar concern with the
relationship between theory and practice through-out his ‘Last Project’. According
to Gouldner, ‘[t]he Coming Crisis of Western Sociology was, despite its length,
meant primarily to begin a discussion concerning the proper relation of sociology
to society, and therefore of theory to practice (Gouldner 1973b: 83). In fact, to
Gouldner, the relationship between theory and practice represents ‘. . . the
central problem facing all sociologies today, both academic and Marxist
(Gouldner 1973b: 93)’.

For Gouldner, academic sociology and Marxism face a common problem that
manifests differently within each. Both project a self-understanding based on a
presumed unification between theory and practice that fails to translate into the
actual practice of either. Practically, both academic sociology and Marxism
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assume that the application of a particular course of action and practices results
in the realization of a set of predefined goals and objectives. Yet, Gouldner’s
critical analysis of American sociology and actually existing socialism indicates
that neither successfully achieves their stated goals and objectives. Like Adorno
and Mannheim, Gouldner’s critiques suggests that a persistent gap between
theory and practice exists within both American sociology – in both its value-free
and partisan forms and Marxism – that undermine their ability to achieve their
stated goals and objectives.

The interaction of the welfare state and American sociology, Gouldner insists,
sought to remedy social problems via technologically driven interventions
designed to maintain the basic institutional structure of society – and by
extension the social sciences (Gouldner 1970: 161). Yet, in order to reconcile
positivism’s indifference toward the state and the welfare state’s view of the state
as the ultimate arbiter of social ills, academic sociology created the conditions
conducive to the production of radical sociological perspectives that undermine
the discipline’s relationship with the welfare state. The radical sociological
paradigms which spawned from a convergence between academic sociology and
Marxism promoted critical perspectives (e.g., the New Left) on American society
that surpassed the prescribe criticality demanded by the welfare state and
ultimately questioned its validity (e.g.,Marcuse 1991).
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This divide between theory and practice is particularly problematic for Marxism
and partisan sociology, which places a special emphasis on the unification of
theory and practice. Within Marxism, the doctrine of praxis provides the
justification for the actions of Marxist social movements and the policies of
socialist parties. Yet to Gouldner, Marxism’s doctrine of praxis obscures the
structure of domination and internal social inequality within Marxism and the
privileged role of intellectuals in an professed proletariat movement, in addition to
promoting a ritualistic incantation of existing Marxist thought at is detrimental to
its further development and historical evolution (Gouldner 1974).

Gouldner On Subject and Object

Following Adorno and Mannheim, Gouldner viewed the divide between theory
and practice as a by-product of the relationship between the individual (subject)
and society (object). While the doctrine of praxis suggests that it is possible for
our thought and action to exist independent of social context, throughout his Last
Project Gouldner continually explored the way in which the individual (subject)
and society (object) are intimately related. Gouldner’s writings on the topic focus
on the ‘mutually interrelated and mutually constituted’ (Gouldner 1970: 493)
nature of the subject/object relationship. For social science, conceptualizing the
subject/object relationship in this manner must translate to an awareness that
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individuals – including social scientists – ‘exist as both subject and object’
(Gouldner 1973b: 101).

The Concept of Mediation in Gouldner’s Works

Gouldner’s portrayal of the subject/object relationship reflects an awareness of
the mediated nature of our social existence. Although, never directly addressed
within his work, the concept of mediation permeates his analysis of post-World
War II sociology and Marxism. In particular, Gouldner emphasized how the social
organization of American society in the post-World War II era contributed to the
formation and hegemony of a particular type of sociology, stating at the
beginning of The Coming Crisis that ‘ social science is a part of the social world
as much as a conception of it’ (Gouldner 1970: 13). For Gouldner (1973b: 95),
The Coming Crisis focuses on how the domain assumptions and sentiments of
theorists act as a mediating force between the theorist and the social world. Yet,
these domain assumptions themselves are a by-product of the relationship
between the theorist and the larger society (Gouldner 1970: 25 – 35).
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Reconstructing Sociology as a Way of Transforming Society

Recognizing the mediated nature of our social existence led Gouldner to
emphasize the need to reconstruct the practice of sociology, in both its western,
academic, and Marxist forms, in order to realize its liberative potentialities. While
he neither denied the possibility of an emancipatory sociology nor dismissed the
potential for sociologists and sociological research to contribute to the realization
of more desirable social conditions, Gouldner emphatically maintained that
existing sociological paradigms were not capable of this task. Both academic
sociology and Marxism, in his view, failed to develop sufficient strategies to
address the irrational elements contained within each. Instead, Gouldner
believed that the reconstruction of the practice of sociology represented a
necessary precondition to establishing the conditions which would permit
sociologists to contribute to efforts to transform the social order in a way that
fosters human liberation and emancipation.

The need to reconstruct sociology results, in part, from Gouldner’s understanding
of the mediation between subject and object and the implications this relationship
has on the practice of sociology, especially one that seeks to bring about social
change that improves social conditions. Gouldner rightfully understands the
practice of sociology to be a representation of society, thus any change within the
practice of sociology would translate to some change within the larger social
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order. As he writes in his essay The Politics of the Mind, ‘[c]learly, we cannot
have a reconstructed society without a critical revamping of our established ways
of thinking about society (Gouldner 1973b: 83).’ For him, the construction of a
new society could not be accomplished in the absence of attempt to reconstruct
the practice of sociology.

Addressing the mediation between the individual and society, to Gouldner,
required restructuring the way sociologists and social theorists organized
themselves. As he states, “my assumption is that it is organization, social
organization, that provides the key mediation between social theory and social
practice. Sociology does not need a Karl Marx or an Isaac Newton; it needs a V.I.
Lenin (Gouldner 1973c: 80).” Gouldner clarified his exhortation of Lenin, citing
the latter’s organizational genius and elaborating that this use underscored the
‘need to focus time and thought on clarifying the requisites of the community life
of social theorists (Gouldner 1973a). Sociologists and social theorists needed to
organize themselves into theoretical communities which would permit them to
understand the conditions for limiting the irrational and ideological elements of
the work and control influence from false consciousness. These collectives would
be tasked with ‘creating a rift with the social world’ in order to struggle against
‘the institutions and conditions that maintain [the dominant definitions of social
reality]’ and ‘design and construct theoretical communities that nourish and
support rational discourse in sociology and social theory (Gouldner 1973b: 79).
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Historical developments within western society also lead Gouldner to pursue a
reconstructed practice of sociology. Gouldner felt that the ability of existing social
scientific and theoretical frameworks to address social and political problems had
been surpassed by the socio-historical conditions in which he lived (Gouldner
1980: 27). The continuation of social problems thought to have been addressed
within the proposed remedies provided by these frameworks demonstrates their
inability to improve social conditions. It is only through the development of
critiques of their positions, strategies, and organizational structures that inform
the process of reconstructing sociological practices that these frameworks are of
any use to the project of improving social conditions. Gouldner maintained that
‘every society is a social reality in part constituted by a kind of everyday social
theory, and that therefore the critique of society and of theory are inseparable
(1973a: 84).’

In this sense Gouldner’s work not only addressed the core issues facing the
establishment of a social justice-themed sociology Adorno and Mannheim
expose through their critiques of the social sciences, but in some ways mirrored
the general thrust of Adorno – and his fellow members of the Frankfurt School of
critical theory – and Mannheim’s respective body of work. This aspect of
Gouldner will be further pursued in the next chapter. Within this chapter I will
highlight some of the more thematic similarities between Gouldner and Adorno
and Mannheim, as well as their differences. Finally, I will examine how these
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differences manifest within Gouldner’s notion of a reflexive sociology and ‘the
Dark Side of the Dialectic’ and what they imply for the future of sociology.
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Chapter Four – Reflexive Sociology and the Emancipatory
Potentiality of Sociology

“I do not believe that social science will ‘save the world’
although I see nothing at all wrong with ‘trying to save the
world’ – a phrase which I take here to mean the avoidance
of war and the re-arrangement of human affairs in
accordance with the ideals of human freedom and reason.
Such knowledge as I have leads me to embrace rather
pessimistic estimates of our chances. But even if that is
where we now stand, still we must ask: If there are any
ways out of the crises of our period by means of intellect, is
it not up to the social scientist to state them?”
– C. Wright Mills The Sociological Imagination (1959:
193) [emphasis in original]

This chapter explores Gouldner’s vision of a reconstructed sociology, which he
felt represented the best hope for realizing the discipline’s liberative and
emancipatory potentiality. Specifically, I will demonstrate how this vision provides
vital insight to the establishment of a social justice-themed sociology. Gouldner’s
vision, despite its seemingly incomplete and fragmented nature, reflects an
understanding of the problematic nature of such efforts and represents a serious
and sustained attempt to develop strategies for addressing them. This vision
benefits from Gouldner’s engagement with both critical theory and the sociology
of knowledge, which enables him to address the substance of their critiques
while eschewing their unsatisfactory conclusions. In short, Gouldner maintained
that establishing a ‘reflexive sociology’ that seeks to attain a new form of
objectivity and directly engages the irrational elements of our attempts to
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understand the social world holds out the possibility for realizing the liberative
potential of social science and social theory.

Similarities and Dissimilarities between Adorno, Manneheim and
Gouldner
The similarity between Gouldner’s ‘Last Project’ and the work of Adorno and
Mannheim extends beyond a shared concern for the relationship between theory
and practice or recognition of the mediated nature of social life. Much of
Gouldner’s own analysis within his ‘Last Project’ is heavily indebted to the
theoretical traditions Adorno and Mannheim represent and reflects a serious
engagement with the problems presented by both. His brand of ‘outlaw
Marxism’13(Gouldner 1976) which explored the ‘Dark Side of the Dialectic’
(Gouldner 1975) facilitates an understanding of Gouldner’s work as a purely
American-ized sociology of knowledge or critical theory.

Gouldner openly expressed an affinity for Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge,
calling him the ‘father of us all’ in the beginning of The Dialectic of Ideology and
Technology (Gouldner 1976: 22), the first book in the ‘Dark Side of the Dialectic’
trilogy. Mannheim’s brand of sociology of knowledge permeates Gouldner’s

13

Gouldner’s use of the term ‘outlaw Marxist’ to describe himself and his theoretical perspective belies the
influence Marxism and Marxian thought had on his own work. While it is tempting to view his early work
as reflecting Functionalism’s inherent conservatism, even then Gouldner felt he was a part of the Marxist
and Marxian traditions (see - Stein, Maurice R. 1982. "Alvin W. Gouldner: The Dialectic of Marxism and
Sociology - the Buffalo Years." Theory and Society 11(6):889 - 97.).
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analysis of the institutional and organizational structure of both sociology and
Marxism. In fact, the ‘systematic analysis of the institutional organization within
the framework of which intellectual activity is carried on’, described as the
primary concern of the sociology of knowledge by Louis Wirth (1985) in his
preface to Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia (1985), could just as easily describe
Gouldner’s own work.

Gouldner also affirmed the ‘lasting, if hybridized influence’ (Gouldner 1976: 22) of
the first generation of the Frankfurt School, with whom he worked alongside as a
graduate student at Columbia (Jay 1982) and whose work he called ‘the most
creative school of social theorists in the twentieth century’ (Gouldner 1973: 424)
at the beginning of his ‘Dark Side of the Dialectic’ trilogy. His understanding of
the divide between theory and practice is deeply indebted to their analysis of and
theoretical reflections on the collapse of the Enlightenment Project (Horkheimer
and Adorno 2002). Equally, his insistence that ‘outlaw Marxists’ need not offer a
positive doctrine as a ‘ransom’ for their critique, but should persistently critic any
and all positive doctrines to find their limits (Gouldner 1976: xvi) resembles the
Frankfurt School’s notion of a negative dialectic and its emphasis on negative
thinking (Adorno 1973; Marcuse 1960).
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The fact that Gouldner grappled with many of the similar issues and problems
that characterized some of the very best social theoretical analysis of the 20th
century underscores the importance of his contribution to both sociology and
social theory. Yet, it is the dissimilarities with both Adorno and Mannheim that
make Gouldner’s theoretical perspective work intriguing for sociologists who wish
to heed the call of the discipline’s prophetic tradition (Friedrichs 1970). Within his
engagement with the question of the relationship between theory and practice
and his attempt to address the effect of mediation, Gouldner sought to fashion a
vision for a reconstructed practice of sociology and social theory that he believed
capable of providing sociologists and social theorists with the capacity to address
the irrational elements of their work. Both his notion of a reflexive sociology and
his exploration of the ‘Dark Side of the Dialectic’ offer insight into how he felt the
practice of sociology could be reconstructed so as to help men ‘in their struggle
to take possession of what is theirs – society and culture – and of aiding them to
know who they are and what they want (Gouldner 1970: 509).’

Gouldner’s desire to establish theoretical communities highlights his divergent
perspective on the role of intellectuals and the intelligentsia from Mannheim’s
sociology of knowledge. While both men shared a concern over the role of this
social group played within the struggle to transform society, their analysis of, and
attempt to come to terms with, the problematic features of sociology and social
theory’s normative foundations led them to draw incompatible conclusions
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regarding intellectuals and the intelligentsia. According to Mannheim (1985: 153
- 164), only a class-less stratum of “socially unattached intelligentsia” possessed
the capability of developing a sensitivity to the dynamic and holistic nature of
society that allows us to diagnose social ills free from the mediating effects of
society. In contrast, Gouldner explored the structural, historical and institutional
conditions facilitating the rise of a critical class of intellectuals. This new class
which in spite of being self-interested and flawed, promoted a culture of critical
discourse that insisted on reflexivity as a part of discourse(Gouldner 1979).

Equally, further exploration into Gouldner’s concept of ‘the Dark Side of the
Dialectic’ reveal important differences with the theoretical perspective promoted
by the Frankfurt School, especially Adorno. Rather than submit to a ‘bitter
negative dialectic’, Gouldner uses his exploration of the irrational aspects of
Marxism to draw out the caged, ‘nightmare’ system that exists in all theoretical
systems and to attempt to develop a new type of objectivity for the social
sciences that understands this tragic side (Chriss 2002). These aspects of
Gouldner’s thought not only mark a difference with the Frankfurt School’s notion
of critical theory, but also represent key features of his conception of a
reconstructed sociology.
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Gouldner’s Vision of a Reflexive Sociology and the Pursuit of
Social Justice

According to Gouldner, his vision of a reflexive sociology represented a crucial
step toward the realizing sociology’s liberative potentialities (Gouldner 1973b).
He maintained that this approach to the study of society improved sociologist’s
and social theorist’s ability to acknowledge and come to terms with the mediated
nature of social life. His vision of a reflexive sociology, while perceived as a
fragmented and incomplete framework primarily expressed in the final chapter of
The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (Lemert 1982), is central to his desire to
reconstruct the practice of sociology.

While the idea of Reflexive Sociology is the focal point of the final chapter of The
Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (Gouldner 1970), the treatment of the topic
there offers only a partial outline of what this approach to sociology would look
like. Here much of the discussion of a Reflexive Sociology emphasizes its ability
to draw out and scrutinize the domain assumptions within sociological research
which contaminate our ability to understand the social world and devise
strategies to address its problematic features. Examining his treatment of
reflexive sociology within his other works, and how these works relate back to his
notion of a reflexive sociology, reveals a much fuller vision of this approach to
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sociology and deepens our understanding of how it is essential to the future
prospects of the discipline.

In a reply to the critics of The Coming Crisis, Gouldner (Gouldner 1973b) directly
connects the project of reconstructing a reflexive sociology to the larger project of
reconstructing society, giving the project the important task of establishing the
prerequisites for rational discourse about the social world. Unlike the
methodological dualism that characterizes mainstream, value-free, sociology, a
reflexive sociology willingly acknowledges the presence of outside influences on
social scientific research. Yet, rather than seek ways for eliminating these
influences, which would deny the mediation of the subject and object, Gouldner
(1970) seeks to enhance our self-awareness of these influences so that their
effect on our understanding of society and ourselves can become part of the
larger discussion regarding its future course and direction. Maintaining a
recognition of the mediation between the individual (subject) and society (object)
represents a key feature of Gouldner’s reflexive sociology.

While theoretical collectives provided the organization structure within which
intellectual activity aimed at altering existing social conditions is to be pursued
(Gouldner 1973b), his notion of reflexivity represented the intellectual perspective
that characterize the work within these collectives. The two are deeply
connected. Without developing a self-awareness regarding the inherent
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limitations of our theorizing about the world, there is little reason to hold out hope
that such theoretical collectives would possess the prerequisite characteristics for
engaging in rational discourse. These collectives are merely an organizational
tool that seeks to address our mediated social existence. They still must possess
a shared understanding of the mediated relationship between the subject and
object, which is an essential feature of a reflexive sociology (Gouldner 1976: 11).

By possessing a disposition toward understanding the interconnectedness of our
individual selves and the larger society, a reflexive sociology, according to
Gouldner, remains vigilant of a gap between theory and practice. Its recognition
of the historically evolving character of sociology and social theory within a
historically evolving society (Gouldner 1970: 507) establishes the need to
continually explore the gap between theory and practice within the specific
historical, cultural, and political contexts in which it exists. A reflexive sociology
requires an analytic outlook that is aware of its historically contingent nature and
possesses a willingness to continually re-analyze its conclusions and actions
based on changes in the larger social structure. In essence a reflexive sociology
possesses an analytic disposition that is never in repose, but remains engage
with the larger social structure in which it is embedded.

Yet, Gouldner’s conception of a reflexive sociology is not merely an approach to
sociology or a technique to the study of society, rather Gouldner views it as a
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total praxis representing a way of life14. To bracket off the non-academic aspects
of the lives of sociologists and social theorists would run counter to
understanding ourselves and our intellectual framework as the result of the
mediation between the individual and society. Thus, Gouldner extends the realm
of concern for a reflexive sociology to include seemingly mundane topics
involving university life and professional associations. In so doing, Gouldner
reminds us that it is the social world closest to us that impact us the most. Yet, it
is also in those areas closest to us that we possess the greatest ability to change
(Gouldner 1970: 503).

Gouldner’s reflexive sociology is also connected to his notion of ‘the Dark Side of
the Dialectic’. It is through the discussion of a reflexive sociology that Gouldner
begins to construct his outlaw Marxist persona and formulate his Dark Side of the
Dialectic trilogy. Yet, the type of new objectivity that Gouldner attributes to this
analytic disposition – the openness to hostile information (Gouldner 1975) – first
finds expression within the concluding chapter of The Coming Crisis (Gouldner
1970: 499). The Dark Side of the Dialectic trilogy also represents a continuation
of the same analytic approach used in The Coming Crisis – a demystification of
Marxism with an understanding that it has failed to produce the human liberation
it has promised (Gouldner 1976: xii).
14

When viewed this way, Gouldner’s notion of a reflexive sociology bears some similarities to Gillian
Rose’s concept of ‘the broken middle (see - Rose, Gillian. 1981. Hegel Contra Sociology. London:
Athlone.). Both considered their analytic approach to be a way of life constantly mindful of the gap that
exists in our ethical and moral activities (see - Tubbs, Nigel. 2000. "Mind the Gap: The Philosophy of
Gillian Rose." Thesis Eleven (60):42 - 60.).
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Exploring the Dark Side of the Dialectic
Gouldner presents two conceptions of ‘the Dark Side of the Dialectic’ within his
body of work. One is embodied within the metaphor of Marx’s illegitimate son,
Henry Demuth, and his explorations of the irrational side of Marxism within his
‘Dark Side of the Dialectic Trilogy’. The other, expressed in an earlier article,
presents an understanding of the dark side of the dialectic project as an attempt
to create a new objectivity. Despite their seemingly disparate nature, it is
necessary to understand how these depictions of the ‘the Dark Side of the
Dialectic’ are connected in order to fully understand the concept. Considering the
concept only in relation to his critique of Marxism promotes an understanding of
this perspective that is too similar to Mannheim’s ‘Marxian critique of Marxism’ in
Ideology and Utopia (1985), or overemphasizes the influence of the Frankfurt
School’s ‘Negative Dialectic’15 on Gouldner’s own theoretical perspective.

Gouldner’s ‘Dark Side of the Dialectic’ trilogy engages in a negative critique of
Marxism that explores the problems of assuming the unification between theory
and practice. As Gouldner writes in the preface of The Dialectic of Technology
15

While the concept of Negative Dialectic is most closely associated with Adorno and his book of the same
name, other members of the Frankfurt School cast the general thrust of their collective project of critical
theory – to the extent that they attempted to create and promote a unified perspective of critical theory (see
Held, David. 1980. Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press. for differences on between their individual types of critical theory) – in terms of
promoting negative thinking (see Marcuse, Herbert. 1960. Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of
Social Theory. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.)
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and Ideology, the first installment of the trilogy, this ‘larger project, is a
demystification of Marxism … an exploration of the limits of Marxist
consciousness (Gouldner 1976: xii).’ A core tenet of his dark side of the dialectic
is that all human activity can be characterized in terms of its contradictory nature
– especially those actions that seek to transform society or improve existing
social conditions. Such actions, Gouldner suggests, possess an inherent
contradiction – a tension between the whole and the part – which serves as a
mechanism for partisan groups to promote their transformative projects as being
beneficial to all social groups despite being grounded within the interests of a
particular social group. This tension legitimates the moral foundations of such
projects while obscuring their true socially mediated origins, which is a necessary
precondition for the former.
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The chapter on ‘Nightmare Marxism’ in The Two Marxisms (1985) perhaps best
exemplifies the analytic results of the dark side of the dialectic. In this chapter
Gouldner writes:
“Every theoretical system has another system inside it
struggling to get out. And every system has a nightmare:
that the caged system will breakout. … The systems
struggling to get out are not only threats to the parent
system’s identity but are also necessary to it. The cage and
the caged help form one another; the repressed systems
also help make the repressor system what it is.” –
(Gouldner 1980: 380)
By exploring the ‘dark side of the dialectic’, Gouldner uncovered Marxism’s
caged system – that the rise of socialism does not transfer power to the hands of
the proletariat, but rather establishes the state as the dominant force in society.
In this nightmare Marxism, the demise of the bourgeoisie leads to an increase in
human domination rather than the emancipation and liberation of mankind. Thus,
to explore the dark side of the dialectic means to acknowledge and analytically
engage in a theory’s caged system, recognizing that every system possesses the
inclination to undermine its stated goals and objectives.

Prior to developing the ‘Dark Side of the Dialectic’ trilogy, Gouldner presented a
different conception of the dark side of the dialectic, one that did not limit itself to
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an exploration of Marxism, but capable of being applied to all theoretical and
scientific frameworks. The subtitle of the article, ‘Toward a New Objectivity’,
emphasizes the purpose of developing this type of analytic method. Far beyond a
mere engagement with Marxism, Gouldner sought to develop a new objectivity
based on an awareness of ‘the limits that interests and desire impose on rational
discourse’ (Gouldner 1975: 7) rather than a false notion of neutrality. This
perspective sought to encourage an openness to accept the reality of our
historical situation and to speak the bad news regarding how this affects
transformative projects aimed at alleviating some social ill.

The conception of the dark side of the dialectic developed within this article
further differentiates Gouldner’s work from the ‘bitter negative dialectic’ of Adorno
and the Frankfurt School. To Gouldner, the type of negative dialectic developed
by Adorno leads to a ‘burned out deadness, without hope for a future (Gouldner
1975: 13).’ He contrasts this with his conception of a ‘dark dialectic’ which
acknowledges the grim nature of our historical situation, the failure of historical
alternatives and their internal contradictions, and concedes the bleakness of the
perceptible future. Yet, this dark dialectic presents a way to re-think these
alternatives in order to recapture what is good and useful within them by
recognizing ‘the bad news’ and acknowledging- our mistakes.
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Gouldner’s notion of the dark side of the dialectic is especially important to
movements seeking to radically transform society, such as those emphasized by
Feagin and Vera’s notion of Liberation Sociology (Feagin 2001b). Such
unapologetically partisan agendas possess a tendency to over exaggerate
research and information favorable to their cause or effort in hopes of further
garnering support or demonstrating their efficacy. They are also likely to overlook
their internal flaws and dismiss attempts to develop any measure of self-criticism.
Indeed, self-criticism is often seen as detrimental to these movements in that it is
viewed as promoting division within the movement and fostering further
fragmentation of the left.
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Conclusion
What the analysis within this thesis should make clear is that the contemporary
discussion surrounding the role sociological research plays in producing
knowledge useful to the pursuit of social justice fails to appreciate some of the
most fundamental aspects of both sociology and social justice. A central premise
of the discipline of sociology is that people are affected by social conditions. Yet,
the discourse of social justice attempts to deny the presence of this feature within
efforts to advance social justice – and within our understanding of society. To
infer that the unification between the theory and practice of social justice can
occur within the context of a highly flawed and unjust society illustrates this point.
Even if sociologists recognized the extent to which our understanding of the
social world is conditioned by our existence within that same social order, it is
doubtful that sociologists committed to social justice recognize how this is
fundamentally problematic nature for such projects – especially those that seek
to radically transform the existing social order.

Thus, if sociologists are truly serious about using their work to improve social
conditions, the practice of sociology would reflect an awareness that such
projects always possess irrational elements which limit their ability to achieve
their stated goals and objectives. In this sense, this type of sociological practice
would be characterized by an awareness that social justice can never be fully
attained, that, at a minimum, some residual injustice will always be present due
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to inherently flawed nature of such projects. A central focus of this practice of
sociology would be on the effect of social mediation on such projects, as well as
a commitment to continually exploring the gap between theory and practice. The
goal of this would be to produce sociological knowledge that reflects on, rather
than representing a reflection of, the current state of American society.

Practicing sociology in the manner described above would necessitate a different
definition of social justice then delineated at the beginning of this thesis. If
sociologists acknowledge the impossibility of social justice, then it would be more
useful to define the pursuit of social justice negatively. To say that sociology is
concerned with social justice, then, would mean that the practice of sociology
reflects an awareness that the potential for producing injustice pervades all
aspects of activities carried out in the name of social justice. Thus, a truly social
justice-themed sociology would be one that focuses on the existence of
contradictions between facts and norms, rather than producing a set of social
facts in support of particular normative claims.

A re-appreciation of Alvin W. Gouldner’s work and his contribution to American
sociology would make a significant contribution to establishing this type of
sociological practice. This thesis is born out of a desire for such a project to take
hold and represents an initial contribution to its development. This project would
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have to try to reproduce the spirit of Gouldner’s theoretical perspective while
eschewing some of the more problematic aspects of his body of work.

While Gouldner’s work offers many insights into both the problematic nature of
using existing social scientific paradigms to construct a social-justice themed
sociology, his own work possesses a number of shortcomings and flaws that
make a verbatim revival of Gouldner undesirable. Yet, the overall spirit of his
work – particularly as it is embodied in his attempt to establish a reflexive
sociology and his exploration of ‘the Dark Side of the Dialectic’ – merit a revival
much in the same way the renewed interest in the work of C. Wright Mills
displayed by sociologists, social theorists, and intellectual historians seeks to
accomplish more than a rote application of ‘the sociological imagination’ (Lemert
2005). Much of this recent work on C. Wright Mills attempts to re-evaluate the
general thrust of Mills’ based on our current knowledge that what we have long
accepted as the defining interpretation of Mills is extremely flawed (Dandaneau
2006; Summers 2007) and demonstrates how the spirit of Mills’ work can help us
understand our current circumstances (Dandaneau 2001). Likewise, a revival of
the basic spirit of Gouldner’s work may help sociologists in their quest to fulfill the
discipline’s essential task – producing knowledge about society that leads to
improving social conditions. However, such work must be mindful of Gouldner’s
own shortcomings.
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In spite of the lengthy critiques of positivism and functionalism, Gouldner’s work
retains far too much of what he saw as most problematic for these types of
sociological paradigms for his work to represent a verbatim guide for establishing
an emancipatory sociology capable of liberating sociology, and by extension
society, from its repressive tendencies. His own critique of Parsons contains a
number of flaws that highlight some of the errors and limitations of his analysis.
In particular, Gouldner never fully broke free from the methodological positivism
that characterized his earlier works (Steinmetz 2002). This hidden trace of
positivism within his work is apparent in his attack on Parsons’s work for an
apparent lack of empirical data (Gouldner 1970: 207 – 209). Likewise, he
conflates positivism with functionalism, seemingly oblivious to the depth of
positivism’s penetration within the unconscious of American sociology in the
post-World War II era (Steinmetz 2005).

Gouldner’s vision for a reconstructed sociology relies on a weak notion of
objectivity. It is perhaps insufficient to say that the social sciences can attain a
newfound sense of objectivity merely by being open to hostile information and
the bad news about their activity and involvement in the world (Gouldner 1985).
This simplistic notion of objectivity glosses over the epistemological challenge of
proving our truthseeking claims. Thus, reviving the spirit of Gouldner’s work
would have to be preceded by an attempt to revise his notion of objectivity in
order to give it more a substantial epistemological foundation.
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Furthermore, the passage of time itself has rendered certain aspects of
Gouldner’s work obsolete, and given birth to new problems that Gouldner could
not possibly have foreseen, nor accounted for within his body of work. Gouldner
famously wrote that social theorists theorize ‘within the sound of guns’ and
amidst a ‘crumbling social matrix of paralyzed urban centers and battered
campuses’ (1970: vii). Yet, sociologists and social theorists today theorize to the
hue of flat screen computer monitors and constant connectivity provided by
smartphones and social networking sites within the matrix of an increasingly
simulated existence (Baudrillard 1994) that suggests that the need for society to
reconcile reality with the image it projects of itself (ideology) may no longer be of
consequence.

Clearly it is unlikely that a relentless critique of functionalism and Parsonian
grand theory, or of the pitfalls of the entwinement of sociological work and the
welfare state, represent what is most needed within sociology today. Instead, it is
perhaps most pressing to understand the short comings of Gouldner’s own
generation of social theorists and sociologists, who have now come to occupy
prestigious positions within the discipline and represent the established
theoretical perspectives. While this generation produced what is perhaps the last
great body of theoretical work within the social sciences, and produced many of
the sociological and theoretical perspectives competing for hegemony today,
their work must also be seen as contributing to the inability of the social sciences
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to sufficiently address the myriad problems facing modern society today. In fact,
the recent global economic crisis, and our inability to develop coherent strategies
to resolve it, exemplifies the ineffectualness of contemporary social science.
Thus, it is the spirit of Gouldner’s work, and not a rote regurgitation of it, that is
most needed today.
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